For elite athletes seeking a winning advantage, manipulation of their own genetic code has become a realistic possibility. In Genetic Technology and Sport, experts from sports science, genetics, philosophy, ethics, and international sports administration describe the potential applications of the new technology and debate the questions surrounding its use.

Advances in genetic technology will enable us to intervene in human biological development to prevent and cure diseases, to restore individuals' functions and capacities back to a normal level after injury and even to enhance them beyond what has hitherto been considered as normal functioning for our species. Such a power to reshape and modify the human condition raises fundamental questions that touch upon the central core of morality. One of these questions is distributive justice. Will all people have equal (...) access to the beneficial effects of genetic technology in general and medical genetics in particular? Most of the new therapeutic and enhancement techniques will probably be quite expensive. That means that, probably during a long period of time after the new genetic technology enters medical practice, its use will be practically monopolized by the rich, to the detriment of all those who are not in a position to afford genetic treatments. In this paper, I argue that the health care inequality that inevitably will follow from the adoption of genetic technology, while posing a challenge to provide as long as possible for genetic interventions for all, is hardly a reason to reject the new technology. In that case, we would have to reject any new medicine or medical technique that cannot be made available to all people at once. Finally, I also argue that the ?enhanced new world? that would follow the introduction of genetic technology, even with the kind of inequality that might then arise, poses no serious threat either to elite sports or to society and should therefore be welcome. (shrink)

Much has been written about recidivist punishments, particularly within the area of criminology. However there is a notorious lack of penal philosophical reflection on this issue. This book attempts to fill that gap by presenting the philosopher’s view on this matter as a way of furthering the debate on recidivist punishments.